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, ' ; r * '% * INTRODUCTION J /
 t 
For the purpose of logically and conveniently con-
sidering the arguments of the respective parties to this 
action, Plaintiffs-Appellants will here reply to the briefs 
of Salt Lake County and Gibbons & Reed and answer 
the brief of Cross-Appellant the State of Utah under 
headings appropriately designating the categories. 
PAET 1 
REPLY TO CONTENTIONS OF DEFENDANT-
RESPONDENT SALT LAKE COUNTY 
I. Judgment Was Improperly Entered In Favor 
Of Salt Lake County. 
A. The Jury Is The Judge Of The Weight 
Of The Evidence. 
The law does not allow the judge to impose his 
judgment as to the "weight of the evidence" after a 
jury has made that determination. Plaintiffs' argument 
is not merely a technical procedural argument. It goes 
to the constitutional right of Plaintiffs to have a jury 
trial. Rule 50(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
applies to legal questions, not to the weighing of the 
evidence if there is evidence to support the verdict. 
The only case cited by Salt Lake County (page 8, Salt 
Lake County brief) refers to substantive rights of the 
moving party, not to the authority of the judge to 
second guess the jury on matters where there is evidence 
to support the verdict. 
2 
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Salt Lake County's Motion for Judgment in its 
favor was neither timely nor did it provide a basis of 
justification for the trial court's departure from the 
jury's verdict. In considering the time at which a mo-
tion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict may be 
made under the Federal Rules, 5A Moores Federal Prac-
tice H50.10 p. 2362 states as follows: 
Since 1963 the time within which a party who 
has moved for a directed verdict at the close of 
N all the evidence may move to set aside the ver-
- diet or any judgment entered thereon and for 
judgment in accordance with his motion for a 
directed verdict is 10 days after the entry of 
judgment. [Emphasis added.] 
The only basis upon which judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict may be granted is stated as follows: 
Thus, the motion for judgment n.o.v. may be 
granted only when, without weighing the cred-
ibility of the evidence, there can be but one 
reasonable conclusion as to the proper judgment. 
•>•'  - Where there is conflicting evidence, or there is 
insufficient evidence to make a "one way" ver-
dict proper, judgment n.o.v. should not be 
awarded. In considering the motion, the court 
must view the evidence in the light most favor-
able to the party who secured the jury verdict 
and this approach governs the actions of appel-
late courts as well as trial courts. Id. H50.07[2] 
p. 2356-7. 
The federal rule is substantially identical to Eule 50b 
of the Utah Eules on this subject. Salt Lake County 
has failed to provide legal justification for the trial 
court's departure from the jury verdict. 
3 
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B. The Evidence Does Support The Jury 
Findings As To Salt Lake County. 
1. Salt Lake County Does Not Deny 
That The Natural Drainage Flow 
Was Changed. 
Salt Lake County admits that the freeway project 
changed the natural flow of drainage (Salt Lake County 
brief, page 2), but seeks to avoid liability on the ground 
that the freeway project was entirely a state project. 
The county further contends that permitting the state 
to connect its freeway drainage to the county system 
did not change the natural flow (Salt Lake County brief, 
page 9). 
The natural flow was not "already changed" by 
the construction of the freeway. The freeway construc-
tion plan contemplated the use of the (Salt Lake County 
drainage system. Salt Lake County was an accessory 
to the plan (E, 1467) (Ex. 7P). It is untenable to as-
sert that the county may agree to the use of its facili-
ties in an overall plan to change the natural flow, and 
then contend that it had no part in the change it au-
thorized. The Salt Lake County change in the use of 
the drainage system by consent became a part of the 
state construction plans to divert the flood waters from 
what was their natural course. The county cannot 
within extended bounds of reason participate in the 
planning and then say it did not do it. 
2. Salt Lake County Created A 
Drainage System. 
There can be no serious contention that Salt Lake 
County did not create a drainage system that incor-
4 
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porated the drainage from the freeway project. The 
true situation is not obscured by asserting without evi-
dentiary basis that there would have been more damage 
to the residents below Olympus Hills if the change had 
not been made. The county had no right or authority to 
determine which of its citizens shall receive the flood 
damage when it agreed to the change in the flow and 
authorized the use of its facilities to affect that change 
by exposing citizens of a different location to a new 
threat of flood waters; it created a drainage system of 
different implications as surely as it changed the flow. 
The comparative damage to different sets of citizens is 
irrelevant to the issue as to whether a drainage system 
was created. In view of all the evidence, the jury found 
that Salt Lake County was negligent in failing to pro-
vide reasonably adequate drainage facilities for the 
highway project and that Plaintiffs suffered damage 
as approximate result therefrom (R. 728). 
3. Salt Lake County Created A Defective 
And Dangerous Condition. 
The answers of Salt Lake County to Plaintiffs' sum-
mary of factors constituting the defective and danger-
ous condition created by the county were properly ar-
gued before the jury which heard all the evidence. It 
can serve no useful purpose in categorically restating 
the contentions of the Plaintiffs or refuting the un-
founded rebuttal of the county. The weighing of the 
evidence is and was left to the jury. The jury concluded 
that "Salt Lake County unreasonably created a de-
fective or dangerous condition in the utilization of its 
storm drain system" [Finding B( l ) E, 723]. 
5 
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We agree with Salt Lake County that Gibbons and 
Keed had a duty to protect the project during construc-
tion, but a contractual agreement between the state and 
the contractor regarding assumption of liability during 
construction does not relieve the county of the concur-
rent liability for its part in the creation of a defective 
and dangerous condition resulting in the proximate 
damage to the Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs are not directly 
concerned with the county's right of indemnification 
from Gibbons and Eeed or the state. Those matters 
are but red herrings in the path of a logical determina-
tion of the county's liability in creating a dangerous 
and defective condition thus damaging the Plaintiffs' 
residences in the county. The statement of counsel that, 
"The contractor had the duty under the contract, to 
protect the work during construction" and that "that 
this was a matter between the state and the contractor 
concerning which Salt Lake County had no duty or right 
of supervision or control" (Salt Lake County brief, 
page 16) seems to be at variance with the views of his 
client. The director of the Salt Lake County flood con-
trol, Mr. Mackay, at the planning meeting of May 29, 
1968, before the project was commenced, stated : 
If we can start one and get going — we have 
engineering done. We need to tie into 36-inch 
line on Wasatch Blvd. which subsequently ties 
into our storm sewer. We have three problems: 
(1) sudden showers; (2) flood; (3) the public 
on our necks. I don't have contractor's schedule. 
I would suggest we sit down with the contractor 
and schedule it. Upper residential section run-
off will create problems. (Ex. 7P, page 5, E. 1751) 
6 
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, 4. Salt Lake County Was Aware 
Of The Danger. 
Why counsel claims "the Plaintiffs' contention that 
Salt Lake County was fully aware of the possible flood-
ing danger in this case is a misstatement of the evi-
dence" is a little difficult to comprehend, particularly 
in view of Mr. Mackay's statement as hereinbefore set 
out. Are we expected to conclude that because Appel-
lant flood victims in this action had never sustained 
damage in previous floods, it supports the county's con-
tention that it had no knowledge of the flood possibil-
ities? Surely the county has not overlooked the fact 
that diverting the waters to a new area exposed a new 
group of residents to flood damage they would not 
otherwise have suffered. This is one of the hazards 
in diverting water from its natural channels. [See 8cm-
ford v. University of Utah, 26 Utah 2d 285, 488 P.2d 
741 (1971).] Characterizing a newspaper report of a 
matter so public as a flood as "hearsay and highly 
prejudicial" does not negate the knowledge that county 
government had of the flood occurrence within its 
borders. The County's own Master Storm Drain Plan 
(Ex. 73P, pp. 1, 2, 11, 44, 78, 79) also clearly outlined 
the existence of a severe potential danger and specifi-
cally identified the subject area near 4500 South and 
Wasatch Boulevard. 
Great stress by respondent is placed upon the duty 
of Plaintiffs to show Salt Lake County sewer plans 
4
'did not meet reasonable engineering standards." (Salt 
Lake County brief, pages 15, 18) The evidence is clear 
that rainfall nearer the mountains where the flood oc-
curred is much heavier than at the airport or down-
7 
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town Salt Lake. Appellants are criticized because no 
suggestion was made as to what data the engineer should 
have used, since no other data existed (Salt Lake County 
brief, page 15). If the nearest records that had been 
kept were in Nevada, would the engineers have been 
justified in relying upon the data without making some 
allowance or deductions? There is nothing so mystical 
in engineering practices that requires engineering testi-
mony to prove that some allowance should have been 
made for the heavier rainfall nearer the mountains. 
That fact requires no special engineering comprehen-
sion. The Salt Lake County flood control director ad-
mitted: "We have three problems: (1) sudden show-
ers; (2) flood; (3) the public on our necks." (K, 1751) 
But they allowed the state to drain the road project 
into the county storm sewer lines. It was the avowed 
contention of the county to "sit down with the contrac-
tor and schedule it out." (R. 1751) Nevertheless, with 
an artificial reservoir created by the partial construc-
tion of a new road, protection of exposed areas not 
completed, and with no grates to protect the county 
sewer system, the contractor and the state were al-
lowed to divert the natural flow to expose the homes 
in a new area to floods. 
5. The Plaintiffs Were Injured 
I t was not assumed for the purpose of the trial that 
each of the Plaintiffs had been damaged (Salt Lake 
County's brief, page 19). The damage was proved as 
specifically set out on page 29 of Appellant's brief. 
The jury found upon substantial evidence that the Plain-
tiffs suffered damage as a proximate result of Salt 
8 
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Lake County's negligence in failing to provide reason-
ably adequate drainage facilities for the highway proj-
ect. The extent of the damage was reserved for later 
and separate determination pursuant to Rule 42(b). 
(R. 59) 
C. Salt Lake County Is Not Immune From Suit 
Under The Facts of This Case. 
Counsel for Salt Lake County has attempted first 
to characterize Plaintiffs' claims against the county as 
being based solely on negligence, and then to apply 
the exception to §63-30-10 (Utah Code Annotated, 1953) 
to excuse such negligence. Neither characterization is 
supported by either the facts of the case or applicable 
law. 
As pointed out in Plaintiffs' original brief, the 
jury below specifically found that "Salt Lake County 
unreasonably created a defective or dangerous condi-
tion in the utilization of its storm drain system" and 
that this caused damage to all Plaintiffs. (Findings 
B(l ) and (2), R. 723; see also Findings E( l ) and (2), 
R. 727). Such findings come within the waiver of im-
munity contained in §§63-30-8 and 63-30-9 (Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953) as follows: < 
63-30-8. Waiver of immunity for injury 
caused by defective, unsafe, or dangerous con-
dition of highways, bridges, or other structures. 
— Immunity from suit of all governmental en-
tities is waived for any injury caused by a de-
fective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any 
highway, road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, 
culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct or other struc-
ture located thereon. 
9 
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63-30-9. Waiver of immunity for injury 
i from dangerous or defective public building, 
.>,.; structure, or other public improvement — Ex-
ception. — Immunity from suit of all govern-
mental entities is waived for any injury caused 
from a dangerous or defective condition of any 
public building, structure, dam, reservoir, or 
j - . r ^ other public improvement. Immunity is not 
waived for latent defective conditions. 
This Court in Sanford v. University of Utah, 26 
Utah 2d 285, 48 P.2d 741 at 745 (1971), in affirming 
an award of damages in an analogous government-
entity caused flood situation, specifically stated as fol-
lows : 
Since the waiver of immunity in Sees. 8 
[§63-30-8] and 9 [§63-30-9] encompasses a much 
broader field of tort liability than merely neg-
ligent conduct of employees within the scope of 
their employment, the legislature could not have 
intended that Sec. 10 [§63-30-10], including its 
exceptions, should modify Sees. 8 and 9, even 
though it is conceded that the negligent conduct 
of an employee might be involved in an action 
for injuries caused by the creation or mainte-
nance of a dangerous or defective condition. 
Salt Lake County's attempt to characterize the 
claims of the Plaintiffs and the findings of the jury as 
resting upon negligence only is totally unsupported. 
However, the jury also found that the county was, 
indeed, negligent. See, Finding 1(1), B. 728. The coun-
ty's attempt to characterize such negligence as involv-
ing a discretionary function is similarly mthout merit. 
10 
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This court has recognized a set of criteria to be 
applied to making a determination as to whether or not 
a discretionary function is involved under §63-30-10(1) 
(Utah Code Annotated, 1953). In Carroll v. State Road 
Commission, 27 Utah 2d 384, 496 P.2d 888 at 891 (1972), 
we find the following: 
In Johnson v. State, [69 Cal. 2d 782, 73 Cal. 
Bptr. 240, 447 P.2d 352 (1968)] the court re-
jected a literal interpretation of "discretionary" 
insofar as that term implied that the mere ex-
istence of some alternatives confronting an em-
ployee did not compel a holding that the govern-
mental unit thereby attained a status of non-
liability. The court stated that these alternatives 
may well play a major part in the resolution of 
the substantive question of negligence, but they 
did not dispose of the threshold question of im-
munity. The court cited several decisions to 
illustrate and reaffirm the principle that al-
though basic policy decisions are allowed im-
munity, this exception is not extended to the 
ministerial implementation of that basic policy. 
The court stated that most of the cases involve 
failure to warn of foreseeable dangers flowing 
from the basic, immune decision. The court fur-
ther observed that a valid consideration in eval-
uating a factual situation was whether there was 
a reason for sovereign immunity, i.e., did the 
employee's decision as to warnings rise to the 
level of governmental decisions toward which 
judicial restraint should be exercised. [Emphasis 
added.] 
The jury found that "Salt Lake County was negli-
gent in failing to provide reasonable, adequate drain-
age facilities for the highway project" (Finding 1(1), 
B. 728). The decision of whether to provide drainage 
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facilities or not may well rest on the discretionary level. 
Once, however, that decision is made, the county is re-
quired to implement the decision in a " reasonable, ade-
quate" manner. This, the jury specifically found, it 
did not do. The county is not immune from the dam-
age "flowing from the immune decision" at the opera-
tional level where the decision is implemented. Neither 
is there present any valid consideration which would 
raise such implementation to the realm where tradi-
tional notions of judicial restraint would be appropri-
ate. The "discretionary function" except to the waiver 
of immunity for negligent acts has no application to the 
case at hand. 
Plaintiffs' claims and proof, and the jury's find-
ing, place the liability of the county outside the protec-
tion of governmental immunity. The trial court erred 
in not entering judgment against Salt Lake County. 
II. Plaintiffs Should Recover Tinder The Doctrine 
Of Inverse Condemnation. 
Plaintiffs-Appellants are fully cognizant of the fact 
that the present law of the state, as expressed by this 
Court, prevents a recovery upon the ground of inverse 
condemnation. But they are also fully aware of the 
fact that the majority of states with similar constitu-
tional language have accepted the doctrine as a matter 
of justice and right. The trend is clearly in the direc-
tion of greater protection for the rights of individuals 
who suffer property damage or loss at the hands of 
their government. The list of cases incorporated in the 
footnote of the initial brief of Appellants at page 36 
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illustrates the basis for a plea to abandon the igno-
minious governmental fiction which deprives the citizen 
of equitable relief for injury inflicted by the state. 
Governmental progress may well demand a new look 
at this time for a humanitarian solution for the prob-
lem of the unfortunate few who wait in vain for an act 
of the legislature. 
Article 1, Sec. 22 of the Utah Constitution grants 
a right to the people of the state, vis-a-vis, state gov-
ernment and its instrumentalities: "Private property 
shall not be taken or damaged for public use without 
just compensation." Section 78-3-4 (Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953) states that, "The district court shall have 
original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal, 
not excepted in the Constitution and not prohibited by 
law; * * *." Plaintiffs urge that, in light of 79 years 
of inaction by the legislature to provide affirmative re-
lief under Article 1, Sec. 22, it is time for this court to 
provide a remedy for the violation of a clearly stated 
right of the people of this State. The language and 
logic of the U. S. Supreme Court clearly apply to this 
situation under Utah law. 
Moreover, where federally [State] protected 
rights have been invaded, it has been the rule 
from the beginning that courts will be alert to 
adjust their remedies so as to grant the neces-
sary relief. And it is also well settled that where 
legal rights have been invaded, and a federal 
[State] statute provides for a general right to 
sue for such invasion, federal [State] courts may 
use any available remedy to make good the wrong 
done. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 768, 784, 90 L.Ed. 
939(1946). 
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See also, Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics 
Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 29 L.Ed. 2d 619, 91 S.Ct. 1999 
(1971). This court has before it here a clear right un-
der the state constitution and a general state jurisdic-
tional statute. I t should exercise its inherent judicial 
authority to "make good the wrong done." The recog-
nition and enforcement of constitutional rights is clearly 
within the province of this court. 
PART 2 
ANSWERS TO CONTENTIONS OF DEFENDANT-
CRQSS-APPELLANT THE STATE OF UTAH 
I. The Trial Court Properly Entered Judgment 
Against The State Pursuant To The Findings 
Of The Jury. 
As was the case with regard to the liability of Salt 
Lake County, an attempt is made by the State of Utah 
to distort the nature of the relief sought against the 
state, mischaraeterize the findings of the jury, and mis-
apply the applicable law. 
The jury below specifically found that: 
The highway project of the State of Utah, in-
cluding the storm drain system, was unreason-
ably defective or dangerous. 
The improvements and highway project cre-
ated by the State of Utah was [sic] unreason-
ably defective or dangerous. [See Findings A and 
D,:R. 721, 727.] 
The state argues that no liability can rest on such 
findings since they do not constitute findings of neg-
14 
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ligence. Again, counsels' attempt to focus attention on 
the waiver of immunity and exceptions for negligence 
contained in §63-30-10 (Utah Code Annotated, 1953) 
while ignoring the specific language of §§63-30-8 and 
63-30-9, quoted supra, is indeed misleading. 
This Court has specifically addressed this issue in 
Sanford v. University of Utah, supra. In that case, 
this court characterized a flood situation as a case 
sounding in nuisance, affirming an award of damages 
to the flood victim. The defendant in the Sanford case 
urged an appeal, as the state does here, as follows: 
On appeal, defendant urges that Sec, 10 of 
the [Governmental Immunity] Act modifies Sees. 
8 and 9, and that under the Act, a governmental 
entity is not liable for a dangerous or defective 
condition causing injury, unless the condition 
was caused by a negligent act or omission of 
an employee committed within the scope of his 
employment. 488 P.2d at 742. 
In rejecting this claim, this Court held as follows: 
A survey of the statutory scheme in the Gov-
ernmental Immunity Act reveals that in Sees. 7 
and 10 of the legislature waived immunity in 
regard to a particular type of tortious conduct 
by a particular class of people, namely, negli-
gent acts or omissions by employees while in 
the scope of employment. In contrast, in Sees. 
8 and 9, the legislature waived immunity in re-
gard to certain interests invaded or harm or 
damages inflicted without reference to the type 
of conduct which earned the invasion. Sec. 
63-30-2(6) provides: 
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The word "injury" means death, in-
jury to a person, damage to or loss of prop-
erty, or any other injury that a person may 
suffer to his person, or estate, that would 
be actionable if inflicted by a private per-
son or his agent. 
This broad definition of injury when con-
?;
 strued in connection with the language of Sec. 9 
indicates a legislative intent to include within 
the waiver of immunity an action for private 
nuisance insofar as the action is predicated on 
a dangerous or defective condition of a public 
improvement that unreasonably interferes with 
the use and enjoyment of the claimant's prop-
erty. 
Since the waiver of immunity in Sees. 8 and 
9 encompasses a much broader field of tort lia^ 
bility than merely negligent conduct of employ-
ees within the scope of their employment, the 
legislature could not have intended that Sec. 10, 
including its exceptions, should modify Sees. 8 
and 9, even though it be conceded that the neg-
ligent conduct of an employee might be involved 
in an action for injuries caused by the creation 
or maintenance of a dangerous or defective con-
dition. 488 P.2d at 745. [Emphasis added.} 
The state's attempt to focus only on the planning 
and inspection of the highway project as the basis for 
the finding against the state is again misleading. As 
quoted above, the Utah statutes specifically waive im-
munity for injury caused by dangerous or defective 
conditions in public improvements, and the jury below 
specifically found the existence of such conditions. An-
alogy to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.A. 
§2671, et seq., and cases arising thereunder, (e.g., Sisley 
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v. United States, 202 F. Supp, 273 (D. Alaska, 1962), 
cited in the state's brief at pp. 28-29) is not enlighten-
ing. Indeed, the federal act has no provisions analo-
gous to §§63-30-8 and 63-30-9. The holding from the 
Sisley case cited in the state's brief would in effect 
emasculate §§63-30-8 and 63-30-9 if applied under Utah 
law. I t would, if applied, exempt the state from liabil-
ity anytime it implements one of its discretionary de-
cisions (e.g., to build a road) in a dangerous or defec-
tive manner. The plain language of the statute and the 
holdings of this court (see, e.g., Carroll v. State, supra) 
clearly reject such a result. 
The findings of the jury below are consistent with 
both the facts and the law, and the judgment of liability 
as to the state should be affirmed, the state having 
waived its immunity in such a case. 
II. The Court Erred In Not Entering Judgment 
For Indemnity Against Gibbons & Reed 
Company 
We agree with counsel for the State of Utah that 
Gibbons & Reed Company had control of the instru-
mentality causing the damage and was guilty of pri-
mary negligence. ((State of Utah brief, page 32). The 
jury found that " Gibbons & Reed Company was negli-
gent in that it failed to take reasonable precautions to 
protect the project during construction." The jury fur-
ther found that this negligence proximately caused dam-
age to Plaintiffs [Findings J ( l ) , K, (Record 728)]. 
Gibbons & Reed clearly agreed to indemnify and hold 
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harmless the state for all suits for damages on account 
of the operations of the contractor or on account of or 
in consequence of any neglect in safeguarding the work. 
Under its contract with the state, the order and se-
quence of construction and the protection of the project 
during construction were matters undertaken by Gibbons 
& Reed Company. 
PART 3 
REPLY TO CONTENTION? OF DEFENDANT-
RESPONDENT GIBBONS & REED 
I. Defendant Gibbons & Reed Does Not Apply 
The Proper Legal Standard In Answering 
Appellants' Arguments. 
In responding to Appellants' brief, Defendant Gib-
bons & Reed assumes that it is with the province of a 
reviewing court (and the trial judge) to reweigh the 
evidence presented to the jury at trial after the jury 
has made specific findings with respect to that evi-
dence. Such an assumption is unwarranted and, in fact, 
conflicts with the appropriate legal standard for re-
view which requires examination of the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the party for whom the jury 
found. See e.g. Porter v. Price, 11 Utah 2d 80, 355 P.2d 
at 66 at 67 (1960). This court has stated that, " I t is 
the declared policy of this court to zealously protect the 
right of trial by jury and not to take issues from them 
and rule as a matter of law except in clear cases." 
Webb v. Olin Matheson Chemical Corporation, 9 Utah 
2d 275, 342 P.2d 1094 at 1101 (1959). 
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Thus, Gibbons & Reed's argument is misdirected 
when it states at page 3 of its brief, -
There is, in fact, almost a total disregard of any 
facts which favor Gibbons & Reed and support 
the actions of the trial court. 
Contrary to the implications of the foregoing assertion, 
the test to be applied on review is not what evidence 
favored Gibbons & Reed, but rather whether evidence 
exists which, when viewed most favorably with respect 
to Plaintiffs, would justify the jury's findings that Gib-
bons & Reed negligently failed to protect the project 
during construction causing damage to the Plaintiffs. 
The duty of Appellants was to call to the attention of 
this court the facts which amply support the findings 
of the jury. 
That evidence which supports the jury's finding 
includes the following matters: (1) During construction 
Gibbons & Reed took no action to prevent rocks, and 
other debris from clogging the storm drains through the 
use of temporary (or permanent) protective drains. 
(2) During construction, Gibbons & Reed failed to en-
sure that storm drains were open and free flowing to 
accommodate large quantities of runoff water.* (3) Dur-
ing construction, Gibbons & Reed removed a curb along 
Wasatch Boulevard and failed to replace it, thus per-
mitting runoff waters from the higher east ground to 
cascade unchecked onto the freeway. (4) Gibbons & Reed 
*The only effort Gibbons & Reed claimed to have made in this 
regard was to observe that some water could flow through the drains. 
No effort was made to make certain that rocks and debris had not 
accumulated during the construction project in the storm drain system 
within the project. 
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failed to install concrete ditch liners or temporary de-
vices to retard erosion in the barrow pits. (5) Gibbons 
& Eeed failed to take any measures to control erosion 
of cut banks. (6) Gibbons & Eeed failed to utilize ditch 
riders or other means to ensure that drains remained 
free-flowing during storms. 
Plaintiffs do not deny that Gibbons & Eeed at-
tempted to explain away the foregoing omissions and 
failures. The company presented rebuttal testimony on 
some of those points and made the same arguments to 
the jury which are made in its brief to this court. Not-
withstanding those arguments and the counter evidence, 
the jury found that Gibbons & Eeed had negligently 
failed to protect the project and that the Plaintiffs were 
damaged thereby. Thus, it must be concluded that the 
jury weighed the evidence, evaluated the arguments, 
and found against Gibbons & Eeed on this issue. The 
arguments and explanations again propounded by Gib-
bons & Eeed constitute merely an attempt to persuade 
this court to reweigh the evidence. Such an attempt is 
improper on appellate review. 
II. The Jury Properly Held That Gibbons & Eeed 
' Negligently Caused Damage to Plaintiffs. 
Gibbons & Eeed asserts at page 11 of its brief that 
it cannot be held responsible for its negligence when 
it is performing work for a governmental authority 
pursuant to plans and specifications furnished by a pub-
lic employer. The cases cited by Gibbons & Eeed, how-
ever, do not support that proposition and are not appli-
cable to the facts of the present situation. 
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As Plaintiffs stated in their brief at page 34, there 
is no dispute that the jury found that Gibbons & Reed 
followed the state's plans. It is in the area of the ex-
ercise of independent discretion as to the protection of 
the project during construction that the jury found 
Gibbons & Reed lacking in proper care. None of the 
cases cited by Gibbons & Reed involves negligence by 
the contractor in performing discretionary matters. 
While it may be arguable that Gibbons & Reed per-
formed its work in conformity with plans and specifica-
tions, it is equally true that Gibbons & Reed did not 
protect the project. The contractor took its chances 
when it removed the curbing from Wasatch Boulevard 
which allowed the flood waters above the project to 
drain into the new road; when it deferred protection 
of its cuts and fills; and when it neither determined 
the conditions of the storm sewer nor protected the in-
lets to the storm sewer. Had the flood come when these 
conditions had been remedied, the result would have 
been different. Although floods were to be expected, 
the contractor lost its gamble because it did not antici-
pate the timing of the flood. 
III. The Trial Court Disregarded The Jury's 
Findings. 
Gibbons & Reed points out that the jury resolved 
several issues in its favor. However, its brief totally 
fails to reconcile its argument with the fact that the 
jury also found one critical issue contrary to Gibbons 
& Reed's position and also disregards the fact that the 
trial court inexplicably disregarded that finding. Con-
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trary to Respondent's contention, Plaintiffs did not at-
tempt to ignore the fact that the jury found some is-
sues in favor of Gibbons & Reed. That matter was ex-
pressly dealt with at page 34 of Plaintiffs' brief. 
It is irrelevant for the purposes of this appeal that 
the jury found any issues in favor of Gibbons & Reed, 
provided that the issue found against Gibbons & Reed 
is consistent with the other findings, which it is. Thus, 
Gibbons & Reed's emphasis on the favorable aspects of 
the jury's findings, while interesting, does not in any 
way affect the fact that the jury also found negligence 
on a crucial item causing proximate damage to Plaintiffs. 
The jury's finding against Gibbons & Reed clearly 
provided the basis for a judgment against Gibbons & 
Reed. Nevertheless, without motion for judgment n.o.v., 
the trial court failed to enter such judgment. As with 
the trial court's failure to enter judgment against the 
county, the failure to follow the jury's findings in the 
face of ample supporting evidence in effect deprives 
the Plaintiffs of their right to a jury trial. Such action 
of the trial court should not be permitted to stand. 
IV. Substantial Evidence Supported The Jury's 
Findings. 
' P l a i n t i f f s ' opening brief discusses the evidence 
which supports the jury's findings. It is unnecessary 
to repeat that information here. But it may be helpful 
to reply to several arguments advanced by Gibbons & 
Reed. 
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First, it is incorrectly stated iiuu "!*.«- <n\\y pos 
sible evidence in ilii> regard related w> ihe drainage 
system and I at k <*f grates" (Gibbons & Reed brief, page 
23). Tln> *Mi-ci matters of evidence were discnssed in 
Plaintiffs' opening brief and also have been repeated 
somewhat above. Suffice it to say at this point that 
several other grounds exist in addition to the lack of 
protective grating. ' 
Second, despite Gibbons & Reed's assertion at page 
23 of its brief, the finding of negligence does not have 
to relate to something other than proper drainage. The 
jury conld have found either that Gibbons & Reed was 
not responsible to provide the proper drainage or ii*at 
Gibbons & Reed properly constructed Hu- drainage sys-
tem, and therefore Gibbons & Reed did not fail 1o pro 
vide a proper drainage system. Even if the jury found 
this, it could (and did) also find that Gibbons & Reed 
negligently failed to protect that system during the con-
struction project. Thus, the jury's finding in paragraph 
J ( l ) (R. 728) could have related to the drainage prob-
lem. 
Third, Gibbons & Reed was certainly on imih= of 
Plaintiffs' claim in that it was specifically alleged thai. 
Gibbons & Reed negligently went beyond iho plans and 
specifications, negligently departed from ihe plans and 
specifications, negligently collected and concentrated 
flood waters in unnatural channels, and negligently 
failed to inspect and maintain during construction the 
storm sewer line. Those allegations were broad in scope 
and included all of the items of evidence against Gib-
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bons & Beed. See Plaintiffs' Complaint. Of course, if 
Gibbons & Beed believed that evidence went beyond the 
complaint, then the time for objection was at trial, not 
on appeal. 
Fourth, it is suggested that because the state re-
quested the interrogatory on which the jury ruled 
against Gibbons & Beed, somehow the jury's ruling is 
invalid. This suggestion is totally unsupported by any 
logic or case law. The interrogatory speaks for itself 
and asks the important follow-up question of whether 
Gibbons & Beed's negligence proximately injured 
Plaintiffs, not the state. The jury answered affirma-
tively, directly linking Gibbons & Beed's negligence with 
the Plaintiffs' injury. 
Fifth, Gibbons & Beed incorrectly asserts that the 
removal of the protective curbing or dike along old 
Wasatch Boulevard and the failure to install the new 
curbing was not negligence, but merely following "nor-
mal sequencing." Evidence was presented on both sides 
of this question, including the fact that in past years 
the protective curbing had, in fact, channeled waters 
away from the Plaintiffs even in very heavy down-
pours. All of that evidence, plus the numerous photo-
graphs, were evaluated by the jury and the jury found 
against Gibbons & Beed. 
Sixth, concerning Gibbons & Beed's contention re-
garding concrete barrow-pit liners, Plaintiffs proved 
that there would be substantial erosion if no protec-
tive liners were in place. Gibbons & Beed admitted 
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that the issue of the sequence of placing ditch liiuM'.s 
was a matter of contract discretion. The jw\ wi \ 
probably concluded thai tho ditch liners should have 
received highest priority In view of t\w potential prob-
W. The same is true with the other protective nu*a*-
urcs which Gibbon« ft "Rood failed to take. 
Seventh, despite the overwhelming weight of sub-
stantial evidence, Gibbons & Reed still argues > o ^ 
brief, page 26) \Uu\ ilu» project \\i\> m»| "..• .. vuinrr-
aM- position ni ihc iim«» of ill*1 :'!MO,J simply because 
the drain system had *T< IS connected. I t ignores the 
following facts: denuded cut banks and slopes, unlined 
barrow pits, no protective grates, no protective curb-
ing, the high potential of torrential cloudbursts in 
August and specifically along the Wasatch front, nul 
uninspected storm drains. 1 K- J. ,I \ bviously did *mi 
ignore the vulnerability issue. This argument -f t In* 
weight of the evidence at the appellate stage, as already 
stated, is untimely. 
V No Other Legal Principles Support The 
Trial Court's Action. 
The cases and "principles" cited by Gibbons & 
Reed at the conclusion of its brief do not support the 
trial court's unexplained and unsupported disregard of 
the jury's findings. 
For example, Gibbons & Reed cites a 1964 Kansas 
case (Knape i\ TAvmg$ton Oil Co., 392 P.2d 842) for 
the propositi^ -'int where answers to in terrogatories 
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conflict, specific answers are given weight over con-
clusory answers. The Knape case is inapplicable here 
because there has been no showing that the jury's an-
swers in any way conflict. As stated above, Plaintiffs 
contend that the subject answers are, in fact, consistent. 
Moreover, the finding of the jury in question [ J ( l ) ] 
is not conclusory. When read in light of the lengthy 
instructions on negligence and the duty of Gibbons & 
Eeed as a contractor, the jury's finding is clear and 
specific. * 
In addition, courts have held that where different 
inferences as to the negligence of a party may reason-
ably be drawn, the determination thereof is within the 
province of the jury. See, e.g., Cleveland, C, C. & 
S. L. R. Co. v. Moneyhun, 146 Ind. 147, 44 N.E. 1106 
(1896). In such cases, it is not error to require the 
jury to make a finding on negligence of one party with 
respect to certain matters in issue. This is exactly what 
the trial court permitted the jury to do in this case. 
The instructions to the jury in this case expressly 
required the jury to make certain findings to support 
its answers to the interrogatories. The interrogatory 
answer itself was specific with respect to the issue in-
volved (protecting the project). Hence, the finding was 
not merely a conclusion of law, but was a proper in-
ference to be found by the jury. The cases of Gilford 
v. Strohecker, 150 F. Supp. 655 (N.D. Ohio 1956), and 
Zieglasch v. Durr, 326 P.2d 295 (Kan. 1958), relate to 
conclusory answers without supporting facts and are 
thus inapplicable. No Utah case even remotely suggests 
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flm^ ^ e j . u r yj g a i l g w e r g gj10„ujc| ^ e disregarded on the 
ground urged by Gibbons & Eeed. Plaintiffs contend 
that Utah law should i***t u> developed at .» is p:»mt in 
achieve a result which in H'lVd druies a party its right 
to a jury trial. -
Tin- -uses of Monsou i\ lhqn; 2W P.2d 580 (Kan. 
1956), ;u.d /Mn . Henderson, 483 l\Jd 1 089 (Kan. 
1971), an ;»!-<» hM applicable here because both are 
based on facts where the jury's findings were incon-
sistent. Tliat iv4 not the case here. 
Finally, Rule 49(a) does not give tin ' n-d ••<nui 
latitude to make findings inconsistent will' issues found 
by the jury. The ability to add does not include the 
ability to contradict. This is the principle of First 
Security Bank of Utah, N.A. I nvriahl, 22 Utah 2d 
433,455 P.2d 88fi (196P"« 
Contrary t<> <Jil>bons & "RIMMPS misleading asser-
i ]«• i s ai pauv ;>0 id' its brief, i h * - trial -ourt made abso-
lutely im finding that Interrogatory J ( l ) was sub-
mitted in error. On the contrary, the trial court made 
no explanation whatsoever of its action. It simply and 
erroneously disregarded a clear and substantial jury 
finding against Gibbons & Reed. 
CONCLUSION 
The liability of the Siat«« <d' \'\nU nr.A Sail L<d<<* 
County has been determiner! l.\ \\u> jurv within tin* im-
munity waiver provisions sei \>\ \\\*> legislature Tin* 
jury has also round that Gibbons \ lu^d Company in 
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violation of its contractual obligation, failed to protect 
its construction project to the damage of the Plaintiffs-
Appellants. If it is possible that a trial judge under 
the circumstances of this case may allow the injured 
parties to pass without a remedy, trial by jury will be 
a delusion and a mockery. 
DATED: MAY.1,1975. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BOYDEN, KENNEDY, ROMNEY 
•i & HOWARD 
JOHN S. BOYDEN 
JOHN PAUL KENNEDY 
GEORGE J. ROMNEY 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
1000 Kennecott Building 
10 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Telephone: (801) 521-0800 
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